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We ask whether Poland is at risk of the boom-bust problem that has afflicted economies around the
time of euro adoption.  Our answer, inevitably, is mixed.  On the one hand the fact that Poland is an
outlier, credit-growth wise, accentuates the danger of a boom if one believes in mean reversion. Our
econometrics indicate that the fall in interest rates that will flow from expectations of euro adoption
will further feed that boom.  On the other hand the fact that interest rates have already converged part
way to euro-area levels (and more extensively than in earlier adopters that experienced a sharp fall
in rates and a pronounced credit boom), especially in the case of lending to firms, suggests that this
shock may be less intense in Poland. And it is certainly conceivable that the same policies and country
characteristics (not always visible to the econometrician) that have restrained credit growth in the past
may continue to do so in the future.  The broader literature also points to two set of factors, the first
of which makes the danger of an unsustainable credit boom more immediate, the second of which
makes it more remote. In the first category are the continuing limitations of the supervisory framework
and the weakness of the finance minister in the budget-making process. In the second are a record
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1.   Introduction 
  This paper takes as a given that Poland will adopt the euro and asks how it should 
manage the transition.
2  It considers the boom-bust problem that has afflicted economies around 
the time of euro adoption.  It analyzes why those boom-bust cycles occurred.  It explores the 
consequences.  It asks what might have ensured superior outcomes. 
  Poland is not Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia.  It is 
important, in other words, to avoid mechanical comparisons.  Compared to other countries that 
did or are experiencing credit booms in the run-up to euro adoption, the growth of credit to the 
private sector has been relatively subdued.
3  The increase in housing prices has been relatively 
limited.  Residential mortgage debt as a percent of GDP remains relatively low.
4 The challenge is 
that it is not always clear in which direction the differences point.  On the one hand, that Poland 
has not displayed similar excesses could mean that it has the problem of booming bank lending, 
excessive wage growth, and housing-market speculation under control.  Firm supervision and 
regulation, cautious monetary and fiscal policies, and competitive product and factor markets 
may mean that Poland is at less risk of these excesses than its predecessors.  On the other hand, it 
could simply be that euro adoption has remained sufficiently remote that there has been little 
                                                 
1 University of California, Berkeley and Vienna University of Economics and  Business Administration, respectively.  
This paper was prepared for the National Report on Poland’s Membership in the Euro Area, commissioned by the 
National Bank of Poland.  It was begun while Steiner was visiting UC Berkeley, whose hospitality is acknowledged 
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2 The current plan is for euro adoption in 2011. 
3 Some might add the qualifier “until recently.” 
4 To avoid misunderstanding, it is important to emphasize that all these are statements about Poland relative to 
comparator countries.   2
reason to expect signs of its effects.  But not long from now, as euro adoption draws near, the 
same dynamics evident in the early adopters may develop.  Indeed, insofar as there is still scope 
for movements in prices and quantities, a displacement of Polish markets may occur.           
  This is not the first paper to consider the credit-boom problem in the run-up to euro 
adoption.
5  Nor is it the first to consider strategies for managing the transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe.
6  But it differs from its predecessors in several ways.  It does not focus just on 
member states that experienced pronounced booms in the run-up to euro adoption; it seeks to 
avoid the problem of selection bias by considering the population of relevant countries.  And it 
looks more closely at Poland’s situation, taking as its focus the structure of its financial markets 
and the organization of supervision and regulation.  
  Section 2 describes the now familiar boom-and-bust scenario.  Section 3 then reviews the 
experience of other catch-up economies that have adopted the euro.  While highlighting the 
credit-boom-and-bust cycle experienced in some such countries, it also emphasizes the existence 
of heterogeneity within this subset of EU member states and points to the absence of 
destabilizing dynamics in some members.  This then leads to a discussion of why experience has 
varied so widely. 
  Section 4 through 6 then take a closer look at Poland.  Section 4 looks more closely at 
credit market and real estate developments.  Sections 5 and 6 then ask whether Poland can avoid 
the kind of boom-bust cycle that has afflicted other catch-up economies adopting the euro.  
Section 5 analyzes Poland’s susceptibility to a credit boom by estimating credit-market dynamics 
in a large sample of emerging market economies and using that model to forecast the evolution 
of private credit.  But forecasting exercises only being as reliable as the assumptions that go into 
                                                 
5 See for example Blanchard (2006), Fagan and Gaspar (2008) and Martin and Schiknecht (2008).  Appendix Table 
A is a summary of contributions to the literature that take the sort of econometric approach that we implement below. 
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them, some uncertainty about the country’s susceptibility nonetheless remains. Section 6 
suggests that the outcome will turn on four issues.  First, how sharply will interest rates come 
down?  Second, how effectively will wage discipline be maintained?  Third, will the government 
be able to resist pressures for increased spending?  Fourth, will bank regulators effectively 
restrain the impulse for an unsustainable credit boom? 
Section 7 summarizes the implications of the preceding analysis. 
 
2.   The Boom-Bust Scenario 
The standard boom-bust scenario for catch-up economies focuses on real interest rates.  
Prior to the adoption of the euro, real and nominal interest rates are high, reflecting capital 
scarcity and imperfect policy credibility.  As accession to the euro area approaches, inflation and 
nominal interest rates converge toward euro-area levels.  Short rates are driven to equality by 
capital mobility and the ECB’s practice of assigning the short-term sovereign debt instruments of 
all euro-area member governments to the same liquidity category, implying the same haircut 
when accepting them as collateral.  Convergence of inflation tends to be slower: there is more 
inertia in product and labor markets, and catch-up economies continue to be characterized by 
relatively high inflation owing to the Balassa-Samuelson effect.   
The consequent decline in real interest rates will stimulate consumption and investment 
spending.  Households and firms will demand additional credit to finance their spending, and the 
financial system will respond.  The decline in real interest rates will put upward pressure on asset 
prices, including the price of real estate.  Strong demand will make for a buoyant labor market, 
encouraging workers to escalate their wage demands.  With investment up and savings down, the   4
current account deficit will widen.  Debt service costs having declined, the government will be 
tempted to increase spending. 
But if the strong growth of real wages persists, international competitiveness will 
deteriorate.  Export growth will slow, and import competition will intensify.  As profits are 
squeezed, firms will cut back on investment, and as growth slows, households will curtail their 
consumption.  As demand falls off, unemployment will rise, and the country will discover that it 
is saddled with a real overvaluation that can be eliminated only through years of grinding 
deflation.  There will be little scope for using stabilizing policy, since the country lacks monetary 
independence and the government will have accumulated a substantial debt.  The party will be 
over.  The souvenirs will be the memories and the hangover. 
A few observations about this story may be helpful.  First, the impact effect will depend 
on the extent of the drop in real interest rates, which will in turn depend on the change in 
nominal rates and on how far above euro-area levels they were prior to the transition.  It will 
depend on the continuing inflation differential and on how far behind the euro area the country is 
in per-capita-income terms.  We should not expect the same real interest rate effect in all cases. 
Second, the reaction of households and firms is not entirely irrational.  Lower real interest 
rates mean positive wealth effects for net foreign debtors.  A lower cost of capital will mean 
faster growth for capital-scarce economies.  It thus makes sense for firms to invest more.  It 
makes sense for households to increase their consumption in anticipation of higher future 
incomes.  One would expect to see faster growth in the short run as the economy traverses to a   5
higher capital/output ratio.
7  One would expect to see transitional current account deficits since 
the increase in consumption precedes the increase in income. 
Third, it is necessary to add disequilibrium dynamics for this temporary acceleration to 
become an unsustainable boom followed by an extended recession.  Real wages have to rise by 
more than is justified by the increase in the capital stock.  Households have to boost their 
consumption by more than is justified by higher future incomes.  The financial system has to 
increase credit to the public sector by more than is prudent given the fundamentals.  The 
government has to increase its spending by more than is warranted by the decline in debt-
servicing costs.
8   
Putting the point this way not meant to deny these possibilities. To the contrary, it is 
natural for agents, never having seen this adjustment before, to extrapolate from the present.  It is 
not surprising that they overreact.  But there is no reason to expect an equally severe 
overreaction in all times and places.  The extent to which real wages rise and competitiveness 
deteriorates will depend on the structure of the labor market.  The extent of the credit boom will 
depend on the structure of the financial system and on how it is regulated.  Whether fiscal policy 
is a problem or a solution will depend on the political circumstances of the government.  The 
extent to which everyone extrapolates the present and overreacts will depend on how many other 
                                                 
7 These are presumably the mechanisms through which membership in the EU and the euro area are supposed to 
give rise to what is known in EU parlance as “convergence” – that is, to closing the gap between per capita incomes 
in the poorer and richer member stats. 
8 Not simply because, like other agents, it gets carried away by the boom but also because it may have been forced 
to contract public spending or raise taxes by more than is politically sustainable in the period when it was seeking to 
quality for admission to the euro area, creating a tendency to relax fiscal discipline immediately thereafter – 
something that the Stability and Growth Pact is designed to address but has not always succeeded in doing in 
practice.   6
catch-up economies have experienced such problems previously and how successfully lessons 
are drawn from their experience.
9 
 
3.   Comparative Experience 
  Figure 1 shows the behavior of real interest rates in catch-up economies adopting the euro, 
other recent entrants to the euro area, and Poland.  A sharp drop in real rates (constructed here as 
the government bond rate adjusted for concurrent CPI inflation) is evident in Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain.  Rates drop from more than five per cent to the neighborhood of zero in all 
four cases before moving back up.
10  That there has been some reversal is not surprising: zero is 
not an equilibrium level for real interest rates.  In all four cases the decline in real interest rates 
began several years before adoption of the euro.  In four cases it persisted for several years 
following the change-over.
11 
  It is harder to generalize about the remaining cases.  In Slovenia real interest rates had 
already declined to low levels in 2003, and with the country’s high income there was relatively 
little Balassa-Samuelson inflation.  It is thus not surprising that there is not much evidence of a 
real interest rate decline as euro adoption drew near.  Malta and Cyprus similarly have relatively 
high incomes and well-developed financial systems.  Evidently their relatively small and 
specialized economies make for volatile real interest rates, complicating inference.  In Poland 
                                                 
9 Another way of understanding these points is in the context of exchange-rate-based stabilizations, which are close 
cousins to euro adoptions. These are episodes where countries bring down inflation by pegging the exchange rate 
and—hopefully—using that space to implement complementary policies. The decline in inflation is likely to be 
gradual (though how gradual is a matter of dispute; see Sargent 1986). Interest rates will come down faster. There 
will be a large capital account surplus and current account deficit as investment surges and flight capital is 
repatriated. Households will go on a spending spree. Unless fiscal policy is tightened or other measures are taken to 
damp down demand, there will be an erosion of competitiveness, and eventually boom will turn to bust.  This can be 
thought of as a more extreme version of the same phenomenon considered here. Models of the process include 
Calvo and Vegh (1999) and Antolia and Buffie (2006). 
10 It is not surprising that the timing and, indeed, the shape of this reversal is different in Ireland, given that 
country’s distinctive industry structure and sensitivity to global high-tech activity. 
11 In Portugal the trend was interrupted in 1999-2000.   7
real interest rates measured on the same basis as in the other countries have already come down 
from 6 per cent to less than 4 per cent – that is, half way to a reasonable equilibrium level of 2 
per cent.  This would seem to imply that the need for a further adjustment and the danger of the 
associated dislocations, while still there, are less than in the first four cases. 
  The figures that follow consider the experience of these same countries in the two years 
prior to euro adoption, in the two years following the changeover, and the two years after that 
(see Figures 2 to 4).
12  For Poland we use the two most recent years of data at time of writing. 
Growth and inflation trajectories are heterogeneous, not surprisingly given that these 
variables are affected by myriad other influences in addition to euro adoption.
13  Portugal 
appears unusual in that its growth rate already slowed in its first two years under the euro, a 
pattern that is not evident elsewhere.  Either the competitiveness problem was unusually quick to 
develop in Portugal, or something else in addition to euro adoption was working to depress 
growth.
14   
One explanation suggested by Blanchard (2006) is that Portugal’s exports have a 
relatively low technology content, placing the country squarely in the sights of China.  
According to the Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of Central Banks (2005), 
some 60 per cent of Portugal’s exports are relatively low tech, compared to 30 per cent for the 
euro area.  Sustaining output and employment growth thus would have required a decline in unit 
labor costs relative to other euro area members, where Portugal saw a substantial rise.  This 
explains why Portugal’s experience differed from Ireland’s and Spain’s, but it does not explain 
why it differed from Greece’s.  According to ESCB (2005), Greece had an even higher share of 
low-tech goods in its exports than Portugal—67 versus 61 per cent—in 2000-1.  (In contrast, 
                                                 
12 Data permitting. 
13 Notably events elsewhere in the EU and the world. 
14 Or both.   8
Spain had 41 per cent, Ireland 14 per cent.)  Evidently, something else was at work in addition to 
the technology content of exports. 
Another possibility is that real wages surged ahead even more strongly than in other 
catch-up economies, both before and after euro adoption, owing not to market behavior but to 
public-sector settlements.  Comparing public- and private-sector wages shows that it was the 
former that led the increase.  In Portugal spending ministries did not face hard budget constraints 
owing to the decentralized nature of fiscal policy making.  The education ministry could agree to 
generous increases in teachers’ pay (teachers being among their constituents) without having to 
worry about how to fund them.
15  Hallerberg and Wolff (2006) show Portugal as having weaker 
budgetary institutions than Ireland and Spain according to their measures of procedural 
centralization and agenda-setting power of the finance minister.  And with public-sector wages 
surging ahead, private-sector salaries followed.   
A related hypothesis is that Portugal entered the period with relatively large fiscal deficits 
as a result of weak budgetary institutions.
16  Even member states with relatively large deficits in 
the late 1990s could become founding members of the euro area because they had the ability to 
prevent the project from going forward, something that is not true of new EU members seeking 
to join the euro area subsequently.  And as a relatively small country, Portugal was then subject 
to stringent application of the Stability and Growth Pact, its deficit/GDP ratio having risen 
further to 4.2 per cent by 2001.
17  That member states now seeking to adopt the euro will have to 
show greater fiscal discipline in the two preceding years (since they lack leverage to block the 
                                                 
15 In Portugal the relevant minister leads negotiations with the corresponding public-sector union; see European 
Industrial Relations Observatory (2007). 
16 The decentralization of budgetary procedures and the lack of agenda-setting power of the finance minister allowed 
primary expenditure as a share of GDP to rise from 34 per cent of GDP in 1990-92 to 37 per cent in 1993-5, 38 per 
cent in 1996-8 and nearly 41 per cent in 1999-2001. Data from Braga de Macedo (2007).   
17 Application has become somewhat less stringent as the country’s doldrums have deepened, allowing the budget 
deficit to widen again.     9
process) is reassuring from this point of view.  That they may similarly be subject to stringent 
application of the Stability and Growth Pact is not unless one is sure that there would otherwise 
be a tendency for fiscal policy to run out of control.   
 
4.  A Closer Look at Credit and Real Estate Market Developments in Poland 
In this section we take a closer look at developments in Poland.  Our focus is on credit 
aggregates and developments in the real estate market. 
Since 2003, credit has grown more slowly in Poland than in any other Central and 
Eastern European country.
18  Figure 5 shows that credit to households and firms followed a 
broadly similar pattern in Poland and in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole in the 1990s but 
diverged thereafter.  To be sure, even before 2000 there were differences between Poland and the 
rest of the region: in Poland credit to firms grew unusually fast in 1998; credit to households 
continued to increase until 2000 whereas it slowed down in the group of comparator countries. 
But the most persistent and visible divergences are after the turn of the century. In the CEE-10 as 
a group, credit to households expanded at rates in excess of 30 per cent per annum and peaking 
in 2004 at a growth rate of nearly 60 per cent.  In Poland, in contrast, the growth of credit to 
households has remained relatively subdued, hovering between 10 and 20 per cent per annum 
prior to 2006, when its growth rate reached 30 per cent.  Even then, this credit aggregate was 
growing at a slower path than the CEE-10 average.  One explanation for this is that the 
classification of bank loans as nonperforming was relatively rigorous and stringent in Poland (at 
least through 2003).  Having to classify a relatively large number of loans as nonperforming left 
Polish banks cash strapped (Breuss, Fink and Haiss 2004).  See also Figure 6.  Subsequently, 
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Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia and Bulgaria.    10
loans previously classified as substandard were reclassified as satisfactory, and credit to 
households took off (National Bank of Poland 2004).   
Credit to firms has grown more slowly both in Poland and the region as a whole.  But the 
contrast between Poland and the CEE-10 is equally dramatic.  In Poland, credit to firms trended 
downward in the first half of the present decade, actually shrinking in 2004-5. This is in contrast 
to the CEE-10, where the growth rate was not only positive and significantly higher than in 
Poland but also trending upward.
19 Investment by Polish firms was therefore relatively subdued.  
Firms used a significant portion of their retained earnings to pay off foreign-currency-
denominated liabilities. Possible explanations include the fact that demand growth was not as 
buoyant as in CEE-10 as a whole, the relatively strict classification of loans as nonperforming, 
which constrained lending to firms by Polish banks (as described above) and political uncertainty 
(including some discussion of the possibility of reversing earlier privatizations).  As with credit 
to households, there are signs (in the data for 2006-7) that the period of very slow growth of 
credit to firms may now be over.  Still, experience to date is rather different than in the rest of the 
region.   
Figure 7 disaggregates not by type of borrower but by currency of denomination.  Again, 
broadly similar movements (punctuated by temporary divergences like the rapid growth of 
foreign-currency denominated credit in Poland in 1998) give way to persistent divergences after 
the turn of the century.  Between 2002 and 2007, both the domestic-and foreign-currency 
components of credit to the private sector grow more slowly in Poland than in the rest of the 
                                                 
19 The Czech and Slovak Republics also experienced negative growth rates of credit to firms at the beginning of the 
decade, but those growth rates recovered fast.   11
region.
20  Again, there are hints that the period of relatively subdued credit growth may be 
coming to an end.  In particular the growth of foreign-currency-denominated credit shoots up in 
2006 at the same time that its growth is decelerating in the rest of the region.  In 2007, Poland 
follows the trend of the comparator group with a decrease in foreign currency credit.  The 
majority of Polish foreign currency loans are denominated in Swiss francs, but there are also 
foreign currency loans in euros and U.S. dollars.  The bulk of these foreign currency loans are 
housing loans secured by mortgages.
21  This suggests where risks may be concentrated going 
forward.
22 
The prices associated with these quantities can be seen in Figures 8-9.  Figure 8 does not 
point to big differences between Poland and the rest of the region in the cost of domestic- and 
foreign-currency-denominated borrowing.
23  Figure 9, which again distinguishes households and 
firms, is more suggestive.  The main change in recent years has been the significant decline in 
the cost of loans to Polish firms, which was concentrated in the period 2001-2003.  This may 
have been due to growing competition from foreign banks, whose presence in the Polish market 
increased significantly in this period.  The cost of borrowing has also declined for households, 
but less dramatically. The result is that borrowing costs for Polish firms are now 
indistinguishable from those of firms in the euro area.  Polish households, in contrast, continue to 
face significantly higher costs than their euro-area counterparts.  This suggests that if there is 
going to be a further drop in interest rates with euro adoption, this will be mainly evident in loans 
                                                 
20  While private credit in foreign currency in CEE-10 increased by 23 percentage points between 2002 and 2005, it 
declined from 19 percent in 2002 to -3 percent in 2005 in Poland.    The only other country besides Poland where the 
growth of private credit was consistently negative in this period was the Czech Republic. 
21 See Polish National Bank (2007). 
22 We will have more to say about the Polish housing market below. 
23 See Luca and Petrova (2007) for an analysis of drivers of foreign currency credit to firms in CEECs.   12
to households, including those for housing-related purposes.  Evidently, this is where concerns 
over the credit-boom-and-bust phenomenon need to focus. 
Finally, the real estate market has behaved differently in Poland than the rest of the region 
(see Figure 10). In the five years ending in 2007, housing prices rose by less than 2 per cent per 
annum, slower than anywhere else in Central and Eastern Europe (Egert and Mihaljek 2007).  
The behavior of rents is consistent with the relatively subdued behavior of prices: since the turn 
of the century rents on cooperatively owned properties have essentially been flat in nominal 
terms, while rents on privately and communally owned properties have risen by about 6 per cent 
per annum, this in a period when CPI inflation has been averaging 3.5 per cent. But house prices 
as a share of disposable income are the lowest of any EU country.  The share of housing loans in 
total commercial bank lending to households was lower than in any country but the Czech 
Republic.
24  The ratio of mortgage debt to GDP as of the end of 2006 was lower than anywhere 
in the European Union except Romania and Slovenia.  The rate of growth of that ratio from 2002 
through 2006 was slower than anywhere but Slovenia.  Mortgage debt per capita is lower than 
anywhere but Romania.  Loan-to-value ratios on typical new mortgages are as low or lower than 
anywhere in the EU but Hungary.
25  All this said, real estate prices have been frothy in the center 
of Warsaw, and the fastest growing component of credit to households has been for housing.
26  
Roughly 40 per cent of those loans are foreign-currency denominated.  Again this points to the 
likely location of risks in the not-too-distant future. 
The fact that bank credit to the private sector as a share of GDP remains low—at 30 per cent 
in 2006 considerably lower than in most of the comparator countries—similarly suggests that 
there may be scope for a lending surge.  In Ireland, Portugal and Spain the ratio of private credit 
                                                 
24 Egert and Mihaljek (2007), Table 2. 
25 Data in this and the preceding four sentences are from Miles and Pillonca (2008). 
26 IMF (2008b), Figure 1, p.21.   13
to GDP was in the range of 45 per cent to 75 per cent prior to the adoption of the euro and rose to 
more than 100 per cent subsequently.  Using earlier data, Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia and Vladkova-
Hollar (2003) estimated an equilibrium ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP for a 
country with Poland’s characteristics on the order of 70 per cent.  Their estimate should now 
probably be regarded as a lower bound.
27 The size of the disequilibrium thus points to the non-
negligible possibility of a credit boom. 
 
5.  An Econometric Analysis of Credit Market Dynamics 
  One way of addressing the question of whether Poland is likely to experience a credit 
boom is to build a model of the determinants of private credit (as a share of GDP) and to 
extrapolate on the basis of forecasts of the independent variables. We use a balanced panel of 
annual data for 50 middle-income countries including Poland and covering the period 1996-
2006.
28  We estimate a model which includes factors driving demand and supply for credit 
(building on previous studies such as Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar 2005):  
                                       -    +       -        + 
    PCGDP = ƒ (INTR, RGDPC, INFL, INDX)     (1) 
 
 
where PCGDP is the ratio of private credit to GDP, INTR is the average nominal interest rate, 
RGDPC is GDP per capita in constant prices, INFL is the year-on-year CPI inflation rate, and 
INDX is a financial openness index measuring the absence of capital controls. (LN in the table 
below indicates that a variable is expressed in logs.)  Specification tests tell us that the data 
                                                 
27 The estimates in Egert, Backe and Zumer (2006) point to somewhat higher equilibrium levels, although the 
authors emphasize the uncertainty surrounding their estimates. Those in Kiss, Nagy and Vonnak (2006) suggest 
somewhat lower equilibrium levels. Details are in Appendix A. 
28 The sample is based on the World Trade Organization of middle-income countries.  The Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Trinidad and Tobago graduated to the high-income category into 2006 according 
to the WTO, as did Slovenia in 1997 and Singapore somewhat earlier.  The country list and other information related 
to estimation are in Appendix B.   14
should be entered in logs rather than levels; in the one case where this is not clear (that of capital 
account openness), we enter the variable both ways.  We also include country dummies where 
these are needed to pick up shifts in the structural relationship.
29   
  Expected signs of the variables are indicated above where they appear in eqn. 1.  We 
expect the interest rate to enter negatively: as interest rates come down, whether for reasons of 
euro adoption, because of unrelated capital inflows or otherwise, we expect private credit to 
boom.  Higher levels of per capita income are indicative of economic and financial development 
and stability conducive to the growth of credit markets and the demand for credit.  Low and 
stable inflation should similarly be conducive to the development of credit markets.  Finally we 
expect a more open capital account (a higher value of INDX) to be associated with a higher 
private credit ratio insofar as this is indicative of a more liberalized financial environment. 
  Results are in Table 4.  The “a” columns show the estimates when we control for country 
fixed effects.  (The two variants differ by whether capital account openness is entered in levels or 
logs.)  All coefficients are statistically significant and enter with their expected signs; the r-
squared is relatively high, and the Hausman test accepts the use of country fixed effects.  
Estimates including time-fixed effects (not reported) differ in that the coefficient on INDX is not 
significantly different from zero, but this version has a relatively low r-squared and, in any case, 
the Hausman test rejects the use of time fixed-effects in favor of period-random effects.  We 
therefore report instead estimates using period random effects in the “b” columns.  The Hausman 
test accepts this specification, the distribution of residuals is normal, and the coefficients are all 
significant.  The one anomaly here, for which we don’t have an explanation, is the negative 
                                                 
29 Most of these are quite intuitive.  The list of retained country dummies is Brazil starting in 1998 (currency crisis 
and inflation stabilization), Colombia starting in 2000 (new reporting system for data), the Dominican Republic 
starting in 2003 (banking crisis), Indonesia starting in 1999 (currency and financial crisis), Suriname starting in 2002 
(new data reporting system), Ukraine starting in 1998 (new and improved data reporting system) and Guyana 
(reason for the structural break not clear to us).   15
coefficient on the capital account openness variable.  Finally in the “c” columns we include both 
country fixed and time random effects.
30  The coefficients are all significant and have the 
expected signs.  We take this as the preferred specification.
31 
  Using this model we can ask whether Poland is a significant outlier.  We construct the 
fitted value of private credit to GDP for Poland for 2006 and compare it with the actual value.  
As expected, the actual value of private credit as a share of GDP (33.3 per cent) is well below the 
fitted values shown in Table 5.  Our preferred specification in column 2c suggests that the 
credit/GDP ratio in 2006 should have been 10 percentage points higher than its actual value.  
(The country-fixed-effects-based estimates point to slightly smaller discrepancies but are 
basically compatible.  The time random effects estimates, with their anomalous coefficients on 
the openness index among other things, point to much larger discrepancies.) 
 Say that the discrepancy disappeared in two years (that the credit/GDP ratio rose by 5 
percentage points in each year).  With nominal GDP growing at 5 per cent, private credit in 
nominal terms would have to be expanding at almost 10 per cent a year.
32  This suggests that 
there is scope for at least a modest credit boom if Poland converges to predicted levels of credit 
in a relatively short period of time.  That said, annual rates of growth of nominal credit of 10 per 
cent are not as alarming as those seen in some other euro-adopting countries.  And a ratio to 
                                                 
30 We also considered a variety of other estimators, such as country random effects and two way random effects, all 
of which yielded broadly compatible results but none of which were obviously preferred on the basis of the standard 
specification tests. 
31 We also conducted a number of sensitivity analyses of the results.  Most of the results were robust to estimating 
the equation in first differences; only the coefficient on the interest rate showed instability.  Estimating the equation 
for the Central and Eastern European countries again produced similar results, although a smaller sample meant 
lower levels of precision.  In addition, limiting the sample to Central and Easern Europe allowed us to enter a 
measure of nonperforming loans (as a share of GDP) – data that we do not have for other regions – which turned out 
to be statistically significant as well.  We did some exploration with other explanatory variables – the ratio of public 
debt to GDP and a measure of corruption/transparency were statistically significant in some specifications.  But we 
stuck with our initial specification for purposes of counterfactual simulation so as to limit the danger of data mining. 
32 There are of course second-round effects: the rise in the denominator of the credit/GDP will raise credit growth a 
bit more according to our estimates.   16
GDP of 43 per cent is not as alarming as the ratios in excess of 80 per cent in countries like 
Estonia and Latvia in 2006. 
A more speculative way of using this model is to assume forecasts for the independent 
variables for 2010 and to compute the predicted value of the dependent variable. We extrapolate 
the independent variables linearly on the basis of recent growth rates. We then extrapolate the 
dependent variable, asking what the credit ratio will look like in 2010 if things continue 
unchanged.   
If the situation in 2005-06 persists, extrapolation suggests a credit/GDP of 58 per cent, up 
from 33 per cent in 2006.  Again this points to an annual rate of growth of nominal credit slightly 
in excess of 10 per cent.
33  If we extrapolate all the independent variables and use our preferred 
model (column 2c), we get a predicted ratio for 2010 of 52 per cent.  This suggests an annual 
average rate of nominal credit growth on the order of 8 ½-9 per cent. 
 
6.  Is There a Boom-Bust Cycle in Poland’s Future? 
How much at risk is Poland of the kind of boom-bust cycle that has afflicted other catch-
up economies adopting the euro?  The answer turns, in our view, on four issues.  First, how 
dramatically will interest rates come down?  Second, will wage discipline be maintained?  Third, 
will the government be able to resist pressure for increased public spending?  Fourth and finally, 
will bank regulators effectively restrain the impulse for an unsustainable credit boom?  Our 
answer to the first question, “not that dramatically,” is somewhat reassuring.  Our answers to the 
second, third and fourth questions, alas, are maybe, maybe and maybe. 
a)  How dramatically will interest rates come down?  
                                                 
33 Again assuming nominal GDP growth of 5 per cent per annum.   17
  Poland’s real interest rates have already come down half-way from typical catch-up-
economy levels to post-euro-adoption levels, as noted above, both because nominal interest rates 
are relatively low and because growth is five per cent, lower than in cases like Ireland in the 
1990s.  This suggests that the financial impulse will be less than in earlier catch-up economies 
adopting the euro. However, as shown in Figure 15,  interest rates on loans to households are still 
much higher in Poland than in the euro area.  The decline in interest rates has been due mainly to 
the decline in rates on credit to firms which still leaves scope for a significant impulse from 
declining rates on credit to households. 
b)  Will wage discipline be maintained? 
A key question is how labor market institutions will respond.  As interest rates come 
down with the adoption of the euro and spending increases, will the pressure of demand pass 
through into wage settlements, eroding the competitiveness of exports?  Evidence on what kind 
of labor market arrangements encourage appropriate adjustments and which ones are conducive 
to the kind of problems alluded to in the preceding sentence is notoriously fragile.  For what it is 
worth the hump-shaped hypothesis of Calmfors and Driffill (1988) suggests that both highly 
decentralized and highly centralized/coordinated systems are likely to work relatively well in this 
context.  In highly centralized and coordinated labor markets, social pacts can be negotiated to 
restrain the growth of wages in the boom period. In relatively atomistic markets, wages will be 
free to adjust downward when the boom ends.  In intermediate systems where union membership 
and bargaining coverage are extensive but not encompassing or well coordinated, these happy 
outcomes are less likely.  Different sectoral unions will not internalize the implications of their 
wage setting for wage setting by other sectoral unions. Leapfrogging will occur.  It will be 
difficult to negotiate a social pact to restrain wage inflation.  Similarly, when the boom ends,   18
there will be resistance to being the first union to agree to wage reductions.  Insiders, who shape 
union policy, will have different incentives than their unemployed brethren.   
Poland appears to be fairly far out in the direction of competitive labor markets.
34  Union 
density is low by EU standards (union coverage somewhat less so, reflecting the ability of the 
government to extend agreements by employers to non-unionized workers in the same sector 
when this is a “vital social interest”).
35  Employment protection legislation is modest by the 
standards of Greece, Spain and certainly Portugal (which had the most restrictive regulations at 
the beginning of the present decade).
36  Wages in different sectors appear to move differently 
depending on the particular demand conditions facing them.
37  There is a very large effective 
number of unions, according to Visser (2004) the largest number of any EU country.  
Historically, there has been a relatively low correlation between public sector wages and real 
wage growth in Polish manufacturing, which militates against Portugal-style wage inflation 
driven by public sector settlements.
38   
All this is reassuring.  Indeed, labor market developments in recent years have not been 
too bad.  While productivity growth and labor force participation may not be all that could be 
hoped for, the growth of unit labor costs has been contained, and competitiveness has been 
maintained.
39  Through 2007 the unit-labor-cost-based real exchange rate was still below 2000 
                                                 
34 Precise rankings differ. That of Visser for 2003 ranks only France and the UK head of Poland in terms of degree 
of labor market decentralization. See Visser (2004). 
35 This is required under the terms of the Labour Code (OECD 2004). 
36 See OECD (2004) and Boeri and Garibaldi (2006). 
37 See Stockhammer and Onaran (2006). 
38 Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) find a lower correlation in Poland and Hungary than in any of the other Central and 
Eastern European economies (they do not, however, consider the Baltics). 
39 This is consistent with the view of Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) that not too much should be made of the slow 
growth of employment, which reflects the continuing efforts of firms to streamline and reduce labor hoarding.   19
levels, an evolution that compares favorably with that in Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
(even) Slovakia.
40 
Less reassuring are two additional observations.  First, relatively competitive labor 
markets are likely to be less good at restraining wage growth during the boom than facilitating 
adjustment during the bust.  The euro-adoption boom will be real: with lower interest rates, 
spending will surge, and with additional demand for domestic goods, labor markets will tighten 
and wages will surge.  This suggests that Poland will not avoid the boom-bust cycle, although the 
bust may be less painful than elsewhere.  Second, there is less than full agreement on the hump-
shaped hypothesis.  We may know less about how institutional arrangements translate into labor 
market outcomes than the preceding discussion suggests. 
c)  Will the government be able to resist pressure for increased spending?  
Among the sources of wage pressure in the boom period are permissive public-sector pay 
policies.  This is a specific instance of the general problem of inadequate fiscal discipline in 
booms.  Theory suggests what kind of fiscal institutions are conducive to the maintenance of 
fiscal discipline.  The budgetary process should be centralized and give the finance minister 
agenda-setting powers.  Parliament should have limited options for disregarding the minister’s 
deficit target.  There should be obstacles to legislative amendments to the budget in mid-year, 
but the finance minister should have options for restoring balance if the deficit widens. 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (2006) consider Poland’s fiscal institutions in this light.
41  
They give the country poor marks for budget preparation.  Although the finance minister has 
agenda setting power—he circulates a document specifying the target deficit—spending 
                                                 
40 IMF (2008b), p.6. 
41A number of other studies undertake this exercise, including Ylaoutinen (2005), Gleich (2006), and Frabizio and 
Mody (2006). The advantage of the Hallerberg and von Hagen study is that the authors trace the evolution of 
Poland’s budgetary institutions over time.   20
ministers can respond to his circular with individual budget bids, and their response can lead to 
changes in the budget balance figure.  Importantly, the final decision on the government’s budget 
proposal is made by the full cabinet, not the finance minister, creating common-pool problems of 
a sort likely to result in excessive deficits.  Poland does better at the legislative stage.  Parliament 
cannot change the deficit target submitted by the government.  The government can call for new 
elections if parliament fails to adopt a budget.  Finally, the country scores high in terms of 
implementation.  Changing the budget in mid-course is difficult (a supplementary law is 
required), transfers of expenditures across budgetary categories require the approval of the 
finance minister, and the finance minister has the power to block expenditures when the deficit 
widens unexpectedly.  Weighing these considerations, Hallerberg and von Hagen rank Poland 
slightly above the Central and Eastern European average, behind Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia 
but ahead of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.
42 
There is some reassurance in the fact that the three Central and Eastern Europeans 
coming in ahead of Poland are all strong-currency countries.  (One has already adopted the euro, 
one has a currency board, and one operates within the narrow-band ERM-II.)   Overall, Poland 
comes close to matching their combination of budgetary discipline and flexibility.
43  It falls short 
mainly because of the weakness of the finance minister.  Although the finance minister can veto 
transfers of funds across spending categories and take steps to narrow the deficit when it widens, 
as noted above, he requires the consent and support of his cabinet colleagues heading up the 
various spending ministries when formulating the budget, which often results in his being at their 
                                                 
42 The data for these other countries are for 2002, their indicators not having been updated subsequently.  Timing 
appears to explain why the estimates in different studies differ. Thus, there was a new constitution in 1997 and a 
new Public Finance Act in 1998 that significantly strengthened budgeting institutions in Poland.  There also have 
been changes over time in the power of the finance minister (which was greater in 2001 than 2006), and there are 
differences in assessment depending on whether indices are constructed on the basis of interviews with policy 
makers or statutory provisions. See the discussion in Hallerberg and von Hagen (2006), p.36. 
43 According to this particular ranking.   21
mercy.  Polish finance ministers have repeatedly resigned or been dismissed for failing to get 
their cabinet colleagues to agree to spending limits.  This does not provide reassurance for how 
the government will respond to the pressure for public spending created by a euro-accession 
boom.  The picture, perhaps inevitably, is mixed. 
d)  Will regulators restrain the impulse for an unsustainable credit boom? 
    The question here is whether the financial system is well regulated, creating confidence 
that boom-and-bust dynamics will continue to be avoided as euro adoption approaches.  In 
support of a positive answer is the fact that Polish banks are well capitalized.
44 There is the fact 
that the Polish Commission for Banking Supervision (the precursor of the current Financial 
Supervisory Authority) promulgated a set of best practices for mortgage-related lending in 2006.  
The hope is that this will encourage banks to carefully manage both the rate of growth and 
composition of their mortgage lending. 
     It may help to put these issues in context.  Financial reform in Poland started with the 
Balcerowicz plan in 1990.  This plan combined liberalization with macroeconomic stabilization 
and aimed at creating the legal, economic, financial and administrative conditions needed for 
transformation to a functioning market economy.  Excessive issuance of money was halted, and 
interest rates were raised to contain inflation.
45  The National Bank of Poland (NBP) was 
prohibited by the parliament from extending long-term credits to the government.  Cheap credits 
and preferential lending by the central bank to state owned firms were curtailed.  Supervision of 
the lending business of commercial banks was reinforced.  
                                                 
44 See e.g. Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar (2003). 
45 Among the main challenges was the establishment of a stable, convertible, national currency, the reduction of the 
high government deficit and external debt burden. Establishment of a demand and supply driven price system, 
privatization and the establishment of free trade were only some of the additional measures included in the 
Balcerowicz plan. For more details see Sachs and Lipton (1990).   22
     Yet the volume of non-performing loans continued to rise during the transition recession 
of 1991-2.
46  Banks had little incentive to provision against potential loan losses and some had 
not accumulated enough capital reserves. In 1992 supervision was intensified to prevent 
gambling to survive. Tighter capital requirements were implemented and the NBP acquired the 
legal power to enforce capital adequacy and loss provisioning standards. The law also imposed 
limits on how much a bank could lend to a single borrower.
47  Polish banks were twinned with 
Western banks to increase their knowledge of modern banking techniques.  Employees were 
offered additional training.
48  Foreign banks were asked to rehabilitate a private domestic bank in 
financial distress when entering the Polish market.  
    Despite these efforts, the quality of Polish banks’ credit portfolios remained poor (Barisitz 
2007).  An Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program (EBRP) was therefore adopted in 1993 to 
address the undercapitalization and bad loan problems.  Specialized regional banks were obliged 
to undergo credit evaluations to qualify for the program.  For those who qualified, one-time 
recapitalization based on the value of their non-performing loan portfolios at the end of 1991 
followed.  Banks were also obliged to work out restructuring agreements with bad debtors or 
forced bankruptcy reorganization or liquidation of those debtors within a fixed period. This 
approach strengthened financial discipline on firms and forced banks to develop and provide 
adequate risk assessment capacities.
49  Restructuring was extended to the cooperative banking 
sector in 1994.  Two cooperative banks (PKO BP and PEKAO SA) and the state agricultural 
                                                 
46 See Barisitz (2007). 
47 No loan could be for more than 10 percent of capital and total loans to a single borrower could not exceed 15 
percent of capital (Mondschean and Opiela 1997). 
48 The IMF and the World Bank supported this effort (Mondschean and Opiela 1997). 
49 At the same time, the restructuring agreements with bad debtors failed to achieve fundamental changes in the 
management and operation of non-financial firms. The restructuring agreements which banks signed with debtors 
dealt primarily with financial conditions and did not address fundamental management or operational changes on the 
part of the debtor.   23
bank (BGZ), were recapitalized in a more centralized approach compared to the above 
mentioned program (Barisitz 2007).
50 
          In the mid 1990s, new accounting principles were introduced and a general deposit 
insurance scheme was implemented.  Bank privatization continued, although the state treasury 
retained significant stakes. As a result, unclear property rights hampered bank restructuring.  In 
1997, banking supervision was reorganized and management processes modernized.  A new 
Independent Commission for Banking Supervision responsible for identification and decision 
making concerning the design of supervisory regulations was established. Executive power 
remained with the NBP. Foreign owners meanwhile were allowed to control a majority of the 
equity of banks and the last remaining stakes of the state treasury were sold to private owners.
51  
Competition in banking increased with foreign owned banks expanding domestic retail business.  
          Harmonization with EU legislation accelerated with the run-up to EU accession.  In 1999 
the NBP set two pre-accession priorities within the National Program of Preparations for 
Membership in the European Union (NBP, 1999): the adjustment of the NBP for operation 
within the European System of Central Banks and the harmonization of Polish banking 
regulations with Community legislation.  In 2004, with Poland’s accession to the EU, European 
legislation on banking, such as the single banking license which aims at facilitating the set-up of 
branches in different European countries, was introduced in the Polish market.  In 2005, banking 
supervision was again enhanced with the implementation of risk-based consolidated supervision. 
          In 2006, “Recommendation S” (issued by the Commission for Banking Supervision on 
March 15
th, 2006) was introduced with the goal of improving the banks’ practices concerning 
                                                 
50 According to Reininger, Schardax and Summer (2001), costs of recapitalization in Poland were lower than in any 
other CEE country . 
51 For more details on privatization and consolidation of the Polish banking sector, again see Mondschean and 
Opiela (1997).   24
credit exposure and strengthening risk management and disclosure to comply with international 
practices. The risk weight on housing loans with loan-to-value ratios exceeding 50 percent was 
raised to 100 percent.  Default risk assessments and regular stress tests for the banks’ mortgage 
portfolios were recommended. More information is to be provided to customers to increase their 
awareness of risks of foreign-currency borrowing. Banks were advised to offer zloty loans first.  
They were instructed not to apply lower customer creditworthiness standards when extending 
foreign currency loans. Regulators also warned that further steps to curb foreign currency 
lending would be implemented as necessary. All this suggests that vigorous supervision and 
regulation limit the danger of an unsustainable credit boom in the run-up to the euro.   
At the same time, there are weaknesses in the supervisory framework. Barisitz (2007) 
identifies “the often arbitrary and inefficient application of new regulations in Poland which also 
reflects lingering deficiencies of the court system.  Attaching collateral can be costly.  
Information systems on credit histories have room for improvement.” Due to the short lending 
history in Poland, foreclosure practices remain largely untested. IMF (2007a, p.30) has observed 
that attempts to clamp down on foreign currency and housing credit growth might simply drive 
business into the nonbank sector, which would increase supervisory challenges without reducing 
the associated risks. 
 
7.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Financial stability in Poland has rested in recent years on a combination of systematic and 
idiosyncratic factors that have moderated the rate of credit growth. By systematic factors we 
mean things like a relatively strict approach to loan classification and other prudential 
regulations, especially before 2004. By idiosyncratic factors we mean things like the behavior of   25
housing prices.
52 The result has been to leave credit aggregates below the levels in other Central 
and Eastern European economies and below the levels one would expect on the basis of the 
experience of emerging markets generally. 
This observation frames the question of whether Poland is at risk of a boom-and-bust-like 
credit cycle in the run-up to euro adoption. On the one hand the fact that Poland is an outlier, 
credit-growth wise, accentuates the danger of a boom if one believes in mean reversion. Our 
econometrics indicate that the fall in interest rates that will flow from expectations of euro 
adoption will further feed that boom.  On the other hand the fact that interest rates have already 
converged part way to euro-area levels (and more extensively than in earlier adopters that 
experienced a sharp fall in rates and a pronounced credit boom), especially in the case of lending 
to firms, suggests that this shock may be less intense in Poland. And it is certainly conceivable 
that the same policies and country characteristics (not always visible to the econometrician) that 
have restrained credit growth in the past may continue to do so in the future. 
The broader literature also points to two set of factors, the first of which makes the 
danger of an unsustainable credit boom more immediate, the second of which makes it more 
remote. In the first category are the continuing limitations of the supervisory framework and the 
weakness of the finance minister in the budget-making process. In the second are a record of 
rigorous prudential supervision and the existence of relatively competitive labor markets.   
Thus, while Poland is not doomed to follow other euro adopters that have experienced 
disruptive boom-and-bust cycles in the run-up to the euro, neither should this risk be minimized.  
Policy makers must remain vigilant as the date of euro adoption approaches, and they must then 
                                                 
52 Housing price developments are of course a consequence as well as a determinant of credit-market developments, 
although they are affected also by other factors.   26
act in response to movements in interest rates, wages, housing prices and credit aggregates 
signaling the immanence of this danger. 
A final somewhat reassuring factor is that Poland’s transition to the euro is unlikely to 
occur for several more years. By that time a number of additional catch-up economies 
presumably will have made the move to the single currency. Polish officials are aware of the 
danger of the credit-boom problem that can accompany entry (Rybinski 2007). The more 
countries that suffer from it—and the more that demonstrate how it can be successfully 
averted— the more likely Polish policy makers are to draw appropriate lessons.  27
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Appendix B: Data and Sources 
 
Country sample: 
23 Latin American countries: Argentina (AR), Belize (BZ), Bolivia (BO), Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), 
Colombia (CO), Costa Rica (CR),  Dominican Republic (DO), Ecuador (EC), El Salvador (SV), 
Guatemala (GT), Guyana (GY), Honduras (HN), Jamaica (JM), Mexico (MX), Nicaragua (NI), Panama 
(PA), Paraguay (PY), Peru (PE), Suriname (SR), Trinidad and Tobago (TT), Uruguay (UY), Venezuela 
(VE) 
 
6 South-, East-Asian countries: China P.R.: Mainland (CN), Indonesia (ID), Malaysia (MY), Singapore 
(SG), Thailand (TH) 
 
21 Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries (CEECs):   
Albania (AL), Belarus (BY), Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary 
(HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Moldova (MD), Republic of Montenegro, Poland (PL), Romania 
(RO), Russia (RU), Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (Sl), Ukraine (UA), Turkey (TR) 
 
Korea, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA), Montenegro, the Republic of Serbia and Turkey were 
excluded from the sample in order to have a balanced panel. 
 
Time span: 
1996 - 2006 
Although the short time span suggests using quarterly data, we apply annual data and follow Brzoza-
Brzezina (2005, 24) who argues that “since the new Member States have undergone a deep transformation 
and their time series are not particularly long, models, especially based on quarterly data, are not always 




Appendix C: Variables and Definitions 
 
 
Private credit: claims on the private sector, stocks 
Source: IMF (2008b). 
 
Interest rate: lending rate, percent per annum, averages; AR, BO, CL, DO, SV, NI, PE, UY: lending rate 
(foreign currency, USD), percent per annum, seasonal adjusted 
Source: IMF (2008b). 
 
GDP Nom.: nominal gross domestic product, flows 
Source: IMF (2008b); United Nations Statistics Division (2008; SR, 2002-2004); WIIW (2008). 
 
GDP Deflator: GDP deflator at constant prices (2000=100), averages 
Source: IMF (2008b); Econstats (SR). 
 
Inflation: change in consumer price index, percent per annum, averages, exchange rate index 
Source: IMF (2008b). 
 
Index of financial liberalization: index measuring the extent of openness in capital account transactions 
Source: Chinn and Ito (2007). 
 
Dummy variables: 
Brazil: sturctural break in private credit to GDP (pcgdp), 1998-2006, no reason indicated. 
 
Colombia: structural break in pcgdp, 2000-2006, new reporting system for data. 
 
Dominican Republic: structural break in pcgdp, 2004-2006, no reason indicated. 
 
Guyana: structural break in pcgdp, 1998-2002, no reason indicated. 
 
Indonesia: structural break in pcgdp, 1999-2006, no reason indicated. 
 
Suriname: structural break in pcgdp, 2002-2006, data based on changed and improved classification 
system of data. 
 
Ukraine: structural break in pcgdp, 1998-2006, changed and improved classification of data. 
Source: IMF (2008c). 
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Table 1.  Growth of credit in CEE-11, 2002-2006 
 
 
Note: Trend growth rate of credit ratios to nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP); Least square 
regressions of the natural logarithm variable series on a time trend are used to obtain the trend growth rate 
of the available observations.
  Growth of private credit in percent of nom. GDP 





Growth of credit to 
general government in 
percent of nom. GDP 
Poland  0.70 8.49  -5.83 1.42  -1.18  7.74 
Croatia  3.34 12.81  3.33  7.82  1.63  18.11 
Czech 
Republic  6.62 20.57  0.07  7.80  -1.93  -29.17 
Hungary  14.34 24.19  10.15  4.97  29.99  21.66 
Slovakia  9.03 21.60  3.71  3.85  11.62  14.36 
Slovenia  13.38 12.00  13.93 -4.56  41.65  1.41 
Romania  20.35 55.84  10.16 26.81  15.15  na 
Latvia  21.74 41.24  11.42  8.39  29.30  -9.72 
Estonia  24.84 31.50  19.77 27.82  23.96  -2.80 
Bulgaria  24.09 39.22  17.58 21.07  28.01  40.74 
Lithuania  30.13 53.36  21.65 27.81  31.88  -20.85   35
Table 2.  Main Initiatives Affecting the Banking Sector, 1989-2007 
 
1989  Banking Act and Act on the National Bank of Poland 
Introduction of two-tier banking system: nine regional banks, private banks admitted 
1990  January: Balcerowicz plan for Poland’s transformation to a market economy 
1991  Recapitalization of banks to cover losses from currency devaluation (based on Balcerowicz 
plan) 
1992  Tightening of banking supervision (capital adequacy and loss provisioning standards) 
Conditional licensing scheme (foreign bank-financed recapitalization of some small credit 
institutions) 
1993  Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program (EBRP): decentralized recapitalization scheme 
for regional state owned banks; initiation of hard budget constraints 
1994  Act on restructuring of cooperative banks (PKO BP and PEKAO SA) and BGZ (state 
agricultural bank) 
Bank Guarantee Fund (implementation of a deposit insurance scheme) 
1995  Implementation of new accounting principles (in accordance with EU guidelines) 
1997/
1998 
Reorganization of banking supervision: Independent Commission for Banking  Supervision 
in charge of identifying tasks and taking decisions; executive power remains with the NBP 
1999  NBP sets priorities within the national program of preparations for membership in 
the European Union 
2001 
2002 
Economic slowdown coincides with cost cutting and rationalization measures; 
Financial situation of PKO BP and BGZ remains fragile, restructuring measures for both; 
KBC assists Kredytbank with capital injection 
2004  Accession to European Union, European banking regulations valid 
2005  Adoption of risk-focused consolidated supervision 
2006  Recommendation S for improvement of banks’ credit exposure 
   
 
Source: Barisitz (2007) and NBP (2001).  36
    Table 3. Rental Rates in Poland, 1996-2006 
 
Rent of dwelling owned 
by a co-operative 
Rent of communal 
or company dwelling  Year 
in zl/1m2 
1996 0,67  0,83 
1997 0,89  1,05 
1998 1,12  1,33 
1999 1,35  1,63 
2000 1,61  1,98 
2001 1,53  1,83 
2002 1,38  2,17 
2003 1,38  2,28 
2004 1,41  2,41 
2005 1,44  2,56 
2006 1,50  2,75 
 
Source: Personal correspondence with Central Statistical Office of the Government of 




Table 4.  Determinants of Private Credit Developments in 44 Emerging and Transition Economies, 1996 to 2006    
                    
Explanatory variables  Dependent variable: lnpcgdp             









(2b) time random 
effects 
(2c) country 
fixed and time 
random 
effects 
                    
constant  2.425***  4.380***  2.650***  2.793***  4.280***  3.167** 
   (6.569)  (28.414)  (7.949)  (7.594)  (27.786)  7.989 
Lnintr  -0.102**  -0.294***  -0.141**  -0.110***  -0.299***  -0.16** 
   (-2.456)  (-6.884)  (-2.489)  (-2.588)  (-7.197)  (-2.476) 
Lnrgdpc  0.160***  0.078***  0.139***  0.139**  0.086***  0.109** 
   (5.244)  (5.268)  (3.019)  (4.524)  (6.572)  (2.071) 
lninfl,  -0.075***  -0.302***  -0.053**  -0.080***  -0.301***  -0.074*** 
   (-3.811)  (-13.031)  (-1.997)  (-4.184)  (-13.617)  (-1.982) 
lnindex_finliberalization,  0.127***  -0.044**  0.140***          
   (5.126)  (-2.520)  (5.883)          
index_finliberalization           0.040***  -0.016***  0.036*** 
            (5.710)  (-3.259)  (3.374) 
dummy_Brazil  -0.353***  0.346***  -0.381***  -0.336***  0.354***  -0.359*** 
   (-8.162)  (5.845)  (-10.631)  (-7.676)  (6.524)  (-8.925) 
dummy_Colombia  -0.283***  -0.109***  -0.313***  -0.300***  -0.105***  -0.350*** 
   (-4.312)  (-3.389)  (-5.992)  (-4.320)  (-3.683)  (-5.266) 
dummy_Guyana  0.202***  0.570***  0.206***  0.199***  0.592***  0.205*** 
   (9.503)  (14.706)  (9.793)  (9.540)  (17.644)  (9.489) 
dummy_Indonesia        -0.853***        -0.886*** 
         (-10.241)        (-11.229) 
dummy_Suriname  0.591***  -0.160***  0.563***  0.550***  -0.144***  0.499*** 
   (6.682)  (-3.276)  (5.054)  (5.708)  (-3.063)  (4.179) 
dummy_Ukraine  2.192***  -0.270*  2.169***          
   (10.972)  (-1.754)  (9.541)          
Adj. r2  0.951  0.347  0.834  0.952  0.347  0.799 
F-Value (sign. of r2)    182.105***  29.559***  46.885***  187.650***  33.056***  38.055*** 
                    
*Static panel data model. GLS estimates with country-fixed or random effects using EViews 5.1. No. of observations 484. t-statistics in 
parantheses, based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White cross-section s.e. and cov.; d.f. corrected). Asteriks indicate the 
significance of the coefficients at the 10% (*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) levels. The Hausman test on fixed effects confirmed the reported 
estimation results at the 5% level. The Jarque Bera test confirmed normal distribution of the residuals. Dummy variables control for 
structural breaks in the time series of the dependent variable. See the Appendix for definitions and sources of the variables. 
  
Source: See text. 
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Table 5. In-sample Actual and Predicted Values of Private Credit to GDP for Poland, 2006 
(in percent) 
           
   actual pcgdp (a)  predicted value of pcgdp (b)  absolute deviation (a-b) 
1a  33.29  41.22  -7.93 
1b  33.29  59.71  -26.42 
1c  33.29  41.85  -8.56 
2a  33.29  43.27  -9.99 
2b  33.29  60.58  -27.29 
2c  33.29  43.61  -10.32 
 
Source: See text.  39
Table 6.  Linear Extrapolation of Credit/GDP Ratio and Forecast Based on Estimated Relationship 




predicted value of pcgdp (b)  absolute deviation (a-b) 
58.28  48.47  9.80 
58.28  83.37  -25.09 
58.28  49.88  8.40 
58.28  52.21  6.07 
58.28  85.20  -26.92 
58.28  52.40  5.87 
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Figure 1: Real Interest Rates around the Time of Euro Adoption 
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Data is averaged for two years prior to adoption (pre-euro adoption); two years post euro-adoption; and the period after that (period 3).
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Data is averaged for two years prior to adoption (pre-euro adoption); two years post euro-adoption; and the period after that (period 3).
Source: IFS
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Figure 3: More Macroeconomic Variables 
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Data is averaged for two years prior to adoption (pre-euro adoption); two years post euro-adoption; and the period after that (period 3).
CPI based; base year is 2000
Source: IFS  
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Data is averaged for two years prior to adoption (pre-euro adoption); two years post euro-adoption; and the period after that (period 3).
Data is for net lending (+)/borrowing (-) of General Government
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Figure 4: Yet More Macroeconomic Variables 
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Pre-Euro Adoption Post-Euro Adoption Period 3
Data is averaged for two years prior to adoption (pre-euro adoption); two years post euro-adoption; and the period after that (period 3).
Data is for net flows o financial account.
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Pre-Euro Adoption Post-Euro Adoption Period 3
Data is averaged for two years prior to adoption (pre-euro adoption); two years post euro-adoption; and the period after that (period 3).
Euro-based data. No data available for Ireland.
Source: Eurostat  
 
















Pre-Euro Adoption Post-Euro Adoption Period 3
Data is averaged for two years prior to adoption (pre-euro adoption); two years post euro-adoption; and the period after that (period 3).
No data available for Greece before 2001 (its pre-euro adoption period). Data for Portgual are estmated values.
Source: Eurostat    44


















Credit to households, PL Credit to firms, PL
Credit to households, CEE-10 Credit to firms, CEE-10
 
Definition: Loans to households include loans to households and non profit institutions serving 
households (NPISH); loans to firms include loans to non financial firms and non monetary financial 
firms; loans to general government.  
 
Source: OeNB (2007) 
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Source: EBRD (2008).  46




















Credit in Zloty, PL Credit in foreign currency, PL
Credit in domestic currency, CEE-10 Credit in foreign currency, CEE-10
 
Definition: Private credit in domestic and foreign currency includes credit to households and firms. 
 
Source: OeNB (2007) 
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Domestic currency loans, PL Foreign currency loans, PL
Domestic currency loans, CEE-10 Foreign currency loans, CEE-6
 
 
Definition: CEE-6 include Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia.Average interest 
rates on loans denominated in (and/or indexed to) foreign and domestic currency. The data do not 
distinguish between credit to the private and public sector. Longer time series on interest rates of foreign 
currency loans are not available. 
 
Source: OeNB (2007), National Bank of Poland (2008).   48


















Loans to households, PL Loans to firms, PL
Loans to households, Euro area Loans to firms, Euro area
 
 
Definition: Average annual interest rate on loans.  
 
Source: National Bank of Poland (2008) and Economist Intelligence Unit (2008).   49
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Average CEE-10, excl. BG and RO
Poland
  
Definition: The index of housing prices is constructed as a weighted average of index of actual rentals for 
housing prices, index of imputed rentals for housing prices, index of maintenance and repair of dwellings 
prices, index of water and miscellaneous domestic services prices, and index of electricity, gas and other 
fuels prices. 
 
Source: Euromonitor International (2008). 